In Praise of Plagiarism

Plagiarism is widely regarded as one of the most egregious of academic sins, whether it is committed to students or by academics. In this post, however, I will focus only on the plagiarism of research by academics, rather than on student plagiarism. Academic researchers and students are engaged in different academic enterprises. The primary purpose of student work is to advance only their own understanding of the subject and to demonstrate this to those who grade it. Since plagiarism would frustrate the achievement of these goals it can be readily condemned. 

But, despite appearances, plagiarism by academics cannot be condemned so readily. It is often held that plagiarism (e.g., “cutting and pasting”, or closely paraphrasing, another’s work and passing it off as one’s own) is wrong because in stealing someone else’s ideas the plagiarist misappropriates the credit that was due to them. Initially, this explanation of why plagiarism is wrong seems correct. The purpose of academic research is to increase knowledge about, and further understanding of, its subject matter. Plagiarized work appears not to achieve either of these ends: It merely replicates discoveries or arguments that have already been made. A successful plagiarizer thus secures credit for moving a debate forward that she does not deserve. 

This condemnation of plagiarism is mistaken for it overlooks the ways in which plagiarized work can disburse knowledge and increase understanding. Academic plagiarists want to publish the material that they plagiarize without being caught. To achieve this, they will seek to plagiarize work that meets two conditions. First, it will be work that the plagiarizer believes her readers would not have encountered before. (Perhaps it was published in another language, or long ago, or in a very obscure outlet.) Second, it will be work that the plagiarizer believes will pass muster as a publishable contribution to the academic discourse into which she attempts to place it. To satisfy these two conditions the academic discussion in question will have to be distant (e.g., linguistically, temporally, or simply by virtue of the obscurity of the original source) from the discussion in which the plagiarized material first appeared. If both of these conditions are met and the plagiarizer succeeds in getting her plagiarized work published, then she would have successfully introduced into the discourse in which it appears work whose readers would treat it as an original contribution by its readers—and one that was sufficiently valuable to warrant publication. Rather than frustrating the furtherance of understanding, then, a successful plagiarist will expect to contribute to it to the same degree as the authors of un-plagiarized work in the same academic outlets.

But if a successful plagiarist will produce work (albeit plagiarized work!) that contributes to the academic debate in which it appears and so has the same potential for furthering understanding of its subject as other published works, why should she be blamed for this? If we think that the primary purpose of academic research is to further knowledge or understanding (and so think that it is against this metric that we should decide whether an academic deserves praise or blame) a successful plagiarist appears to deserve praise, not blame, for her actions. To be sure, she has stolen the work of another—but she has done so in a way that furthers the academic enterprise. She would in this respect be similar to an executor of a famous novelist’s will who, instead of burning his unpublished manuscripts as instructed, publishes them. Such a faithless executor would be guilty of theft. But from the point of view of the literary world her actions should not be considered to be on a par with those of a common thief whose dishonesty benefitted only herself. Indeed, she would be more likely to be praised for bringing the work to the attention of a wider audience. A successful plagiarist should receive the same accolade.  

Perhaps, though, this defense of plagiarism has moved too quickly. After all, a plagiarist could simply have quoted and properly referenced her sources or paraphrased them with proper citations. This would have enabled their discoveries or ideas to have been introduced into the debate by the plagiarizer without her wrongfully misappropriating the credit due to their original author. 

This way of defending the standard condemnation of plagiarism is faced with a dilemma. If the plagiarized work is published because those who reviewed it believed that it was worthy of publication owing to its perceived originality, then it would not have been published if it was (honestly) presented as a recitation of work that was already available. In this case the contribution that the work would have made to the debate would be lost—and so to protect the value of this contribution the plagiarist’s approach (plagiarism!) would be justified. If, however, the work would still have been published had the plagiarized material been properly cited then the originality of that material would not have been the reason for its publication. Instead, the referees would have been impressed by the plagiarizer’s use of it, such as her demonstration of its relevance for the debate to which she contributed it. If this was so then the credit for the work would not primarily be owed to the author of the original work (whether plagiarized or not), but to the academic who drew upon it to contribute to the debate into which she introduced it. So, on one hand, if the plagiarizer would not have had her work published without plagiarizing, then her contribution to the debate would depend on her plagiarism. If this was so, then insofar as it would contribute to either the knowledge or understanding of its readers her plagiarism would be justified. On the other hand, if the work would have been published even if she had properly cited her sources, then the credit that she is owed for it would not be derived from her plagiarism. Thus, if in this case she did plagiarize she could not be faulted for wrongfully misappropriating the credit owed to another: The credit would be all hers. In the first case, then, the plagiarism would be justified; in the second it would be (almost) blameless.

This is not to say that plagiarism by academic researchers is entirely blameless. It is certainly dishonest. But this minor wrongdoing could be readily outweighed by the benefits that it could confer on the debates in which it occurs. Indeed, if we should judge academic behavior by the degree to which it furthers or impedes the purpose of academic research plagiarism is a far lesser academic sin than one that is far more common: Careless scholarship. The failure to check references (whether one’s own or those provided by others) for accuracy could lead to the propagation of false claims. (Such as the widespread view—long since debunked by Laura Martin—that Eskimos have many different words for “snow” as they categorize the world differently from non-Eskimos.) Since the propagation of substantive falsehoods would be more likely to undermine knowledge and impede understanding than plagiarism, it is the former, and not the latter, that should be decried as the worse academic sin. 

If you agree with me here… feel free to pass these arguments off as your own! 

James Stacey TaylorComment